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Brown University
Abstract
As the study of moral judgments grows, it becomes imperative to compare results across studies in order to create
unified theories within the field. These efforts are potentially undermined, however, by variations in wording used by
different researchers. The current study sought to determine whether, when, and how variations in wording influence
moral judgments. Online participants responded to 15 different moral vignettes (e.g., the trolley problem) using 1 of
4 adjectives: “wrong”, “inappropriate”, “forbidden”, or “blameworthy”. For half of the sample, these adjectives were
preceded by the adverb “morally”. Results indicated that people were more apt to judge an act as wrong or inappropriate
than forbidden or blameworthy, and that disgusting acts were rated as more acceptable when “morally” was included.
Although some wording differences emerged, effects sizes were small and suggest that studies of moral judgment with
different wordings can legitimately be compared.
Keywords: morality, wording, trolley problem, language.
1 Introduction
More and more psychological and neuroscientific re-
search on moral judgments appears each year. As fasci-
nating results accumulate, the question arises of whether
and how individual studies fit together to form a larger
picture. In order to connect various studies and guide
future work in this field, researchers need to determine
which studies conflict, which support each other, and
which are simply talking past each other.
Unfortunately, precise comparisons are hampered by
the use of different moral terms across studies. Differ-
ent researchers ask whether acts are wrong (e.g., Cush-
man, 2008; Haidt et al., 1993; Schaich Borg et al.,
2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), forbidden versus per-
mitted (e.g., Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2006),
(in)appropriate (e.g., Greene et al., 2004; Moore et al.,
2008; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006) or deserve blame
(e.g., Cushman, 2008; Pizzaro et al., 2003). Some
researchers include the adverb “morally” before these
terms (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Schaich Borg et al.,
2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), whereas others do not
(e.g., Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et
al., 2004; Pizzaro et al., 2003; Valdesolo & DeSteno,
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2006). It is unclear whether judgments of what is morally
wrong vary in response to the same factors as do judg-
ments of what is forbidden, inappropriate, or blamewor-
thy. Some evidence comes from a meta-analysis on the
asymmetry between “forbid” versus “allow” in attitudes
research. This study demonstrated that people are re-
luctant to forbid but will readily not allow, even though
these judgments are conceptually equivalent (Holleman,
1999). This asymmetry suggests that moral judgments,
as well, may be influenced by subtle variations in word-
ing. Further evidence from Cushman (2008, Experiment
1) showed that harmless acts were judged as more wrong
than blameworthy only when the act was intended and
believed to cause harm. This finding also suggests that
people, in some circumstances, will draw fine distinctions
between moral terms.
Until the effects of wording variations are understood,
we cannot tell whether studies on similar moral issues
couched in different terms really agree or disagree. In ad-
dition, some wording effects on moral judgments would
undermine the search for a moral faculty. Some re-
searchers suggest that moral judgments result from innate
psychological mechanisms, or even a moral module that
conforms to a universal moral grammar (Dwyer, 1999;
Harman, 1999; Hauser et al., 2008; Mikhail, 2007). Oth-
ers propose dual-process models that build emotions or
beliefs, desires, and consequences into the processes that
form moral judgments (Cushman et al., 2010; Greene
et al., 2004). These theories and many more would be
challenged if people judge acts in very different ways
based on the moral terms used, because psychologically
real mechanisms would be unlikely to vary markedly
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with such fine differences in wording within a particu-
lar natural language. Conversely, if certain patterns of
moral judgments are robust enough to persist through
non-substantial variations in wording, it would help de-
fend the assumption that these studies are investigating
distinctive psychological mechanisms.
In order to bring this research together into a coherent
field and determine whether there are distinctive psycho-
logical mechanisms to be studied in moral psychology,
we need to know whether, when, and how much phrasing
questions in different terms may lead to different moral
judgments. As an exploratory first step toward answer-
ing these questions, we tested the effects of four different
moral adjectives across six different types of moral judg-
ments.
2 Methods
2.1 Participants
Adult participants who had an internet protocol address
within the United States were recruited through Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk. This online participant recruit-
ment system has been shown to produce quality data
(Hsueh et al., 2009; Paolacci et al., 2010; see also Kit-
tur et al., 2008, for a description of this system). A
total of 845 participants received $3 for completing the
study. Ninety-seven participants were removed for in-
sufficient responding (withdrawal before completing the
second block), seven for suspicious responding (predom-
inantly entering the first available response across mea-
sures), and one for being younger than 18 years, leaving
a final sample of 740 participants (716 participants pro-
vided complete data; see Table 1 for demographics). The
sample was majority female (60.3%), White (70.1%), and
ranged in age from 18 to 85 years (M = 33.5 years, SD =
11.38 years). To account for cohort effects, we controlled
for age in all analyses.
2.2 Moral vignettes
Participants read 15 vignettes, each displayed on a new
screen, which presented a hypothetical person’s morally
ambiguous behavior. After each vignette, participants re-
sponded to a statement expressing disapproval of the be-
havior (e.g., “turning the train was wrong”) using a 9-
point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = nei-
ther agree nor disagree; 9 = strongly agree). Low val-
ues, therefore, indicated acceptability and high values in-
dicated unacceptability. The 15 vignettes were divided
into six blocks of moral judgments1:
1These blocks loosely followed Haidt’s (2007) distinctions between
types of morality (namely harm, purity, and fairness), but were not an
Table 1: Demographics of the final sample (N = 740)
n or M (SD) % or Median
Sex
Female 446 57.9
Male 261 33.9
Age 33.5 (11.4) 31
Race/Ethnicity
White 540 78.1
Asian-American 68 9.8
Other 48 6.9
African-American 35 5.1
Religion
Protestant 215 27.9
Catholic 122 15.8
None 111 14.4
Other 85 12.7
Atheist 66 9.9
Hindu 25 3.7
Jewish 15 2.2
Buddhist 14 2.1
Mormon 14 2.1
Yearly income
< $20,000 146 19.0
$20,001 - $40,000 167 21.7
$40,001 - $60,000 119 15.5
$60,001 - $80,000 97 12.6
$80,001 - $100,000 53 6.9
> $100,000 36 4.7
Highest level of education
High school degree 89 12.6
Some college 209 27.1
Associate’s degree 52 6.8
Bachelor’s degree 248 32.2
Post-graduate degree 104 13.5
• Trolley — three vignettes in which the actor kills
one person in order to save five others by either
flipping a switch to divert a train (sidetrack, loop)
or pushing a man in front of the train (footbridge)
(Hauser et al., 2007).2
exhaustive list. The full vignettes are available from the first author
upon request.
2Hauser et al. (2007) included diagrams with some of these vi-
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• Victimless — three vignettes describing taboo be-
haviors: brother-sister incest (Haidt, 2001)3, canni-
balism, and interspecies sex.
• Harm versus offense — two vignettes comparing
a private transgression, stealing money from a lost
wallet (Greene et al., 2001)4, with a public taboo,
sexual intercourse.
• Deceit — two vignettes comparing deception
through lying versus omission.
• Moral luck — three vignettes in which a drunk
driver ignores a stoplight and either kills a pedes-
trian, misses a pedestrian, or there is no pedestrian
present.
• Disgust — two vignettes that compare sloppily eat-
ing unconventional foods privately versus publically
(Feinberg, 1985).
2.3 Design and procedure
The experiment was a between-subjects 2 (Order) x 2
(Adverb) x 4 (Adjective) randomized full factorial. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to respond to the 15
moral vignettes with 1 of 4 adjectives: “wrong”, “inap-
propriate”, “forbidden”, or “blameworthy”. Whether the
adjective was preceded by the adverb “morally” was also
randomly assigned. The judgment made by a given par-
ticipant (e.g., “morally wrong”) remained constant across
vignettes. Blocks were assumed to be independent and,
thus, were presented in the same order across partici-
pants. Presentation order within each block, however,
was randomly assigned to 1 of 2 conditions (Table 2).
A short description of the survey, including compensa-
tion, was posted online. Participants voluntarily clicked a
hyperlink that directed them to our website, which served
a multi-page Ruby on Rails application. After partici-
pants indicated they were at least 18 years old and pro-
vided informed consent, they made 15 moral judgments
and provided demographic information.5
2.4 Analysis and power
To test for general effects of wording variations on moral
judgments, a repeated measures analysis of covariance
gnettes. To keep these vignettes comparable to the other blocks in the
current study, we omitted these diagrams.
3This vignette was adapted to no longer indicate that the sexual inter-
course drew the brother and sister closer together. We made this change
in order to make the vignette more morally ambiguous.
4This vignette was adapted from the first-person to the third-person.
5Participants were instructed not to use the back button on their in-
ternet browser, but in such rare instances all responses were recorded.
We used participants’ first response to all items unless they changed a
non-response to a response.
Table 2: Presentation order of moral vignettes.
Block Order 1 Order 2
Trolley Sidetrack Footbridge
Loop Loop
Footbridge Sidetrack
Victimless Incest Interspecies
sex
Cannibalism Cannibalism
Interspecies sex Incest
Harm versus offense Lost wallet Public sex
Public sex Lost wallet
Deceit Lying Omission
Omission Lying
Moral luck Pedestrian killed Pedestrian
absent
Pedestrian missed Pedestrian
missed
Pedestrian absent Pedestrian
killed
Disgust Private Public
Public Private
(ANCOVA) controlling for age was performed, with
between-subjects factors of Order (2 levels), Adverb (2
levels), and Adjective (4 levels); Vignette (15 levels) was
the within-subjects factor. This analysis, however, ig-
nored the distinction between different types of moral
judgments. To determine, therefore, whether effects were
limited to specific types of morality, repeated measures
ANCOVAs were performed separately for each block.
The within-subjects factor in these six ANCOVAs con-
tained either 2 or 3 levels, depending on the number of
vignettes in that block.
Because sufficient power is required to claim mean-
ingful null effects (i.e., wording makes no difference),
we conducted a sensitivity analysis using G*Power 3.1
(Faul et al., 2007) to determine how small of an effect we
could detect in each ANCOVA. For a repeated measures
ANCOVA with a within-between factor interaction, 16
between-subjects groups, 15 repeated measures (Cron-
bach’s α = .81), a Type II error probability of α = .05,
and power equal to .80, we could find an effect size >
.032 (i.e., a small effect; Cohen, 1992). We also per-
formed this analysis for each block separately and found
we could detect an effect > .06 for blocks with three judg-
ments, and > .08 for blocks with two judgments, both
small effects. After collecting the data, we confirmed that
we achieved sufficient power to find these effects using
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a post-hoc power analysis for each block. Using a con-
servative estimated effect size of .08 and a Type II error
probability of α = .05, power for 5 of 6 tests was > .94,
the exception being the harm versus offense block, which
had power of .81. These tests provided evidence that our
analyses were sufficient for detecting a small effect in the
data.
3 Results
3.1 Overall analysis
Main effects. The repeated measures ANCOVA6 for
all 15 moral judgments revealed significant between-
subjects main effects for Order, F(1,622) = 5.18, p =
.023, generalized eta-squared (ηG2; Bakeman, 2005; Ole-
jnik & Algina, 2003) = .040, Adverb, F(1,622) = 4.75, p
= .030, ηG2 = .008, and Adjective, F(3,622) = 4.04, p =
.007, ηG2 = .019, and a significant within-subjects effect
of Vignette, F(14,8708) = 30.53, p < .001, ηG2 = .047 (see
Table 3 for all means and standard deviations). Because
Order is meaningless across blocks, it is explored below
in further detail. For Adverb, participants were more ac-
cepting when “morally” was present (M = 5.57, SE = .06)
versus absent (M = 5.76, SE = .06). For Adjective, partic-
ipants judged acts as more wrong (M = 5.81, SE = .08) or
inappropriate (M = 5.80, SE = .08) than either forbidden
(M = 5.59, SE = .08) or blameworthy (M = 5.45, SE =
.09). Figure 1 displays means and standard errors for the
eight Adverb x Adjective conditions.
Interactions. There were no significant between-
subjects interactions. Because the assumption of spheric-
ity was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction
(1959) was applied to all within-subjects interactions.
The Vignette x Order interaction, F(8,8708) = 13.83, p <
.001, ηG2 = .012, and the Vignette x Adverb interaction,
F(8,8708) = 3.06, p = .002, ηG2 = .003, were significant.
To understand these interactions, they are described be-
low for each block in which they achieved significance.
3.2 Analysis by block
Main effects. Each block showed a significant within-
subjects Vignette effect. The Order main effect was found
for the Trolley block, F(1,646) = 55.23, p < .001, ηG2 =
.079: these behaviors were judged more acceptable when
side track was presented first (M = 3.73, SE = .11) versus
last (M = 4.90, SE = .11); and the Disgust block, F(1,643)
6Age produced a significant between-subjects effect in the overall
analysis, F(1,622) = 8.32, p = .004, as well as for the Trolley block (p
= .006), Victimless block (p = .024), and Harm versus offense block (p
= .027). Means indicated in all cases that older participants rated these
behaviors are more unacceptable than younger participants.
= 10.31, p = .001, ηG2 = .016: unconventional eating was
judged more acceptable when first described publically
(M = 3.46, SE = .12) versus privately (M = 4.01, SE =
.12). The Adverb effect only emerged for the Disgust
block, F(1,643) = 17.68, p < .001, ηG2 = .027: these acts
were more accepted when “morally” was included (M =
3.37, SE = .12) versus excluded (M = 4.09, SE = .12).
The Adjective effect was found for the Victimless block,
F(3,639) = 3.46, p = .016, ηG2 = .016, and the Disgust
block, F(3,643) = 4.68, p = .003, ηG2 = .021. Partici-
pants judged victimless offenses as less blameworthy (M
= 5.60, SE = .17) than either wrong (M = 6.17, SE = .17),
inappropriate (M = 6.31, SE = .16), or forbidden (M =
6.17, SE = .16). Disgust acts were judged as more wrong
(M = 4.00, SE = .17) or inappropriate (M = 4.10, SE =
.17) than either forbidden (M = 3.41, SE = .16) or blame-
worthy (M = 3.42, SE = .18).
Interactions. Again, a Greenhouse-Geisser correction
was used on all tests. The Vignette x Order interaction
emerged only in the Trolley block, but was qualified by
a significant Vignette x Order x Adverb x Adjective in-
teraction that did not appear in the overall test, F(5,1292)
= 2.78, p = .017, ηG2 = .011. When footbridge was pre-
sented first, footbridge was rated as more unacceptable
than either sidetrack or loop across moral terms. When
sidetrack was presented first, however, “blameworthy”
(but not “morally blameworthy”) showed no significant
differences between vignettes, F(2,70) = 2.36, p = .102.
Finally, the Vignette x Adverb interaction emerged for the
Disgust block, F(1,643) = 12.31, p < .001, ηG2 = .019:
there was a smaller difference between judgments of pri-
vate disgust when “morally” was included (M = 2.31, SE
= .15) versus excluded (M = 2.66, SE = .14) than there
was for public disgust (Ms = 4.44, 5.52, SEs = .14, .13,
respectively).
4 Discussion
4.1 Implications
This study suggests that wording effects do not under-
mine psychological studies of moral judgments. For harm
versus offense, deceit, and moral luck, we found no ev-
idence of wording effects, indicating that these types of
morality are robust against linguistic variations. We did
find wording effects, though, for victimless offenses, dis-
gust, and the trolley scenario. For the Victimless and
Disgust blocks, we discovered scaling effects: partic-
ipants judged victimless offenses as less blameworthy
than wrong, inappropriate, or forbidden, and disgust as
less blameworthy and less forbidden than wrong or in-
appropriate. In addition, participants were more likely
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Table 3: Means and standard deviations for all moral judgments.
Order 1 Order 2
“Morally” included “Morally” omitted “Morally” included “Morally” omitted
Vignette W I F B W I F B W I F B W I F B
Sidetrack 3.70
(2.81)
2.92
(2.78)
2.88
(2.82)
2.45
(3.10)
2.98
(2.66)
3.00
(2.87)
3.35
(2.96)
3.30
(3.02)
4.23
(2.32)
3.76
(2.68)
4.14
(2.38)
3.62
(2.80)
4.44
(2.10)
3.68
(2.81)
4.42
(2.75)
4.41
(2.53)
Loop 3.50
(2.76)
3.13
(2.42)
2.60
(2.60)
2.57
(2.80)
2.92
(2.63)
2.94
(2.65)
3.25
(2.76)
2.70
(2.52)
5.34
(2.42)
5.05
(2.67)
4.86
(2.25)
4.03
(2.97)
5.07
(2.11)
4.37
(2.76)
4.96
(2.57)
5.11
(2.50)
Footbridge 4.95
(2.49)
5.77
(2.48)
5.00
(2.76)
5.12
(2.56)
5.53
(2.68)
5.02
(2.67)
5.58
(2.72)
3.98
(2.59)
6.24
(2.11)
5.76
(2.54)
5.40
(2.27)
5.14
(2.58)
5.54
(2.18)
5.74
(2.78)
5.09
(2.80)
5.37
(2.52)
Incest 5.70
(2.89)
6.59
(2.74)
6.29
(2.68)
5.92
(2.69)
6.54
(2.55)
6.65
(2.27)
6.21
(2.71)
6.18
(2.87)
6.38
(2.54)
7.27
(1.84)
6.39
(2.60)
6.05
(2.99)
6.57
(2.25)
6.12
(2.70)
6.49
(2.62)
5.80
(3.00)
Cannibalism 5.23
(2.96)
5.23
(2.77)
5.63
(2.84)
5.30
(2.86)
5.79
(2.88)
5.71
(2.53)
5.23
(3.07)
4.71
(2.85)
6.25
(2.31)
5.71
(2.80)
5.33
(2.84)
5.19
(2.94)
5.09
(2.80)
5.34
(2.91)
5.56
(2.95)
4.24
(3.21)
Inter. sex 6.48
(1.94)
6.59
(2.60)
6.62
(2.29)
5.95
(2.76)
7.04
(1.86)
6.60
(2.37)
6.02
(2.62)
6.05
(2.31)
6.34
(2.42)
6.79
(2.06)
6.33
(2.57)
6.14
(2.72)
6.24
(2.26)
6.31
(2.75)
5.96
(2.90)
5.67
(3.11)
Lost wallet 5.58
(2.42)
6.10
(2.55)
6.10
(2.48)
5.85
(2.49)
6.04
(2.32)
6.10
(2.26)
5.90
(2.42)
5.15
(2.88)
5.80
(2.36)
5.80
(2.81)
6.22
(2.35)
5.85
(2.92)
6.41
(1.73)
5.91
(2.73)
6.05
(2.34)
5.64
(2.75)
Public sex 5.72
(1.92)
5.87
(2.40)
5.78
(2.27)
6.40
(2.18)
6.71
(2.10)
6.79
(1.89)
6.06
(2.48)
5.50
(2.87)
6.09
(2.33)
6.24
(2.18)
5.93
(2.03)
6.14
(2.36)
5.83
(2.52)
6.17
(2.49)
6.19
(2.29)
6.27
(2.58)
Lying 6.74
(1.44)
6.31
(2.04)
6.41
(1.96)
6.32
(1.91)
6.73
(1.77)
6.54
(2.15)
6.15
(2.32)
5.98
(2.36)
5.93
(1.95)
5.06
(2.46)
5.22
(2.49)
5.57
(2.62)
6.87
(1.66)
6.47
(2.28)
6.07
(2.57)
6.51
(2.27)
Omission 5.82
(1.96)
5.21
(2.71)
5.69
(2.17)
5.63
(2.18)
5.85
(2.12)
5.27
(2.44)
5.00
(2.52)
5.80
(1.81)
5.55
(2.32)
6.07
(2.28)
5.29
(1.98)
5.56
(2.47)
6.89
(1.54)
6.88
(2.04)
6.50
(1.94)
6.75
(1.93)
Ped. killed 7.74
(.83)
7.54
(1.59)
6.92
(2.14)
7.60
(1.36)
7.71
(.77)
7.44
(1.65)
7.23
(2.04)
7.42
(1.38)
7.54
(1.03)
7.14
(2.16)
6.93
(2.42)
7.00
(2.51)
7.53
(1.29)
7.38
(1.98)
7.09
(2.43)
6.98
(2.48)
Ped. missed 7.47
(1.13)
7.36
(1.44)
6.70
(2.05)
7.07
(1.62)
7.60
(.87)
7.56
(1.43)
6.92
(2.16)
7.40
(1.52)
7.04
(1.87)
7.46
(1.05)
7.02
(1.72)
7.25
(1.99)
7.38
(1.35)
7.58
(1.11)
7.05
(2.04)
7.42
(1.86)
Ped. absent 7.24
(1.46)
7.21
(1.54)
6.61
(2.13)
7.00
(1.40)
7.42
(1.37)
7.33
(1.51)
6.60
(2.44)
7.33
(1.38)
2.58
(2.46)
2.45
(2.94)
2.56
(2.62)
1.56
(2.57)
7.41
(1.38)
6.89
(2.19)
6.96
(2.12)
6.93
(2.29)
Private 3.08
(2.90)
2.26
(2.34)
2.33
(2.59)
2.80
(2.84)
3.23
(2.95)
3.81
(2.90)
2.83
(2.96)
2.60
(2.80)
2.34
(2.68)
2.23
(2.66)
2.15
(2.59)
1.71
(2.27)
7.02
(1.56)
7.20
(1.23)
6.70
(1.87)
7.14
(2.00)
Public 5.18
(2.48)
4.97
(2.33)
4.29
(2.76)
4.45
(2.75)
6.34
(2.07)
5.96
(1.89)
5.27
(2.41)
5.95
(2.08)
4.13
(2.65)
4.85
(2.44)
3.80
(2.78)
4.08
(2.26)
5.38
(2.42)
5.48
(2.61)
4.49
(2.81)
4.62
(2.49)
Note. SDs in parentheses. Scale: 1 = acceptable; 9 = unacceptable. W = “wrong”, I = “inappropriate”, F = “forbidden”,
B = “blameworthy”.
to condone disgust when “morally” was included in their
judgment. It is noteworthy, however, that the wording ef-
fects we found in both blocks did not cross the scale mid-
point. Inasmuch as one can assume that responses above
versus below the midpoint indicate global judgments of
moral unacceptability versus acceptability, wording did
not appear to change global judgments, only the strength
or certainty of those judgments. In other words, people
did not judge incest, for example, as “wrong” but not
“blameworthy”; the tendency was only to judge it as more
wrong than blameworthy.
The picture was more complicated for the trolley vi-
gnettes. When footbridge was presented first, we repli-
cated the finding that pushing the man in footbridge is
judged as less acceptable than flipping the switch in side-
track or loop (Cushman et al., 2006), regardless of moral
term used. When sidetrack was presented first, how-
ever, blameworthiness was rated similarly across all three
vignettes, suggesting that wording effects do occur in
some orders of trolley scenarios. Similar to the results of
Cushman (2008), this finding suggests that judgments of
blame are determined uniquely from global judgments of
wrongness. The current finding that “morally blamewor-
thy” demonstrated the expected order effect further sup-
ports this idea, suggesting that the inclusion of the adverb
altered this judgment to be more abstract. We must ac-
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 7, December 2010 Wording effects in moral judgments 552
Figure 1: Mean moral judgments across 15 vignettes by Adverb and Adjective.
knowledge, however, that these differences showed very
small effect sizes (ηG2 < .05), indicating that the influence
of wording variations on moral judgments was negligible.
4.2 Limitations
Online data collection limited our control over the partic-
ipant population and the testing environment. We elim-
inated approximately one-eighth of the original sample
for incomplete or inappropriate responding, but this rate
was comparable to previous studies on the utility of Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk (Kittur et al., 2008). Additionally,
reaction times suggested that as many as 100 more par-
ticipants may have rushed through the experiment, but
analyses without these participants did not differ from
the results presented. This rate of “gaming” the system
was substantially lower, however, than in previously pub-
lished reports (Kittur et al., 2008). In addition, we tested
moral wording across an array of moral judgments in a
within-subjects design: Having participants judge such
varied situations without counterbalancing may have bi-
ased our results toward null effects. Future studies may
be better served by focusing on a single type of judgment
(e.g., the trolley problems) and examining a more com-
prehensive set of moral terms.
4.3 Conclusion and future directions
Our results indicate that participants in moral psychology
studies are interpreting different moral terms in a similar
manner, suggesting that researchers are studying a real
psychological phenomenon, not a linguistic artifact. Our
findings are also compatible with the possibility of a uni-
versal moral faculty or grammar. Although we did not
examine every moral term used in previous studies or in
our natural language, we believe the use of eight com-
mon terms makes our results sufficiently generalizable. It
seems unlikely that people would process “wrong”, “in-
appropriate”, “forbidden”, and “blameworthy” in similar
ways yet provide radically different responses to another
related term.
Researchers should, however, still be cautious regard-
ing the terms used in their studies. We found evidence
that people are less apt to forbid (Holleman, 1999) or to
lay blame (Cushman, 2008), so to the extent that the mag-
nitude of judgments is relevant to one’s research ques-
tion, similar terms should be used across studies. In ad-
dition, we also found evidence that judgments of purity
may be more susceptible to these wording effects than
harmful acts. These effects are likely to be found in
any situation, like the disgust scenarios, in which the be-
haviors are governed by cultural norms but not formal
rules or laws. It may be prudent, therefore, that stud-
ies of moral purity only be compared when the adverb
“morally” is included in participants’ judgments. Finally,
the trolley vignettes appeared to be interpreted differently
when participants were asked to judge blameworthiness,
but not moral blameworthiness: future research should
take care not to treat wrongness and blameworthiness as
interchangeable concepts, but acknowledge that they are
likely derived from different processes (Cushman, 2008).
As the field expands, a meta-analysis on moral judg-
ment research that examines wording as an independent
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variable will be necessary. From our findings, we do not
expect large wording effects to emerge, but such research
is yet to be completed. In addition, neither the types of
morality studied nor the moral terms used were exhaus-
tive, limitations that require follow-up studies. Related to
this point, future research should also test whether word-
ing may shift people between utilitarian and deontologi-
cal perspectives. Some of the terms used in the current
study were more relevant to a deontological framework
(e.g., “forbidden”) than a utilitarian one, and follow-
up work could compare these moral terms to judgments
of whether behaviors should be done or would be best.
These steps will facilitate comparison of studies in the
field of moral psychology and help build a coherent pic-
ture of how people understand morality.
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